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Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction

Michael Ostrovsky, Andrzej Skrzypacz

Mathematics of Operations Research · 10.11.2026

DOI: 10.1287/moor.2024.0730 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematics of Operations Research, online erschienen am 10.11.2026. Verfasst von Michael Ostrovsky und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 18 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We revisit the classic result on the (non-)existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the generalized first-price auction for sponsored search advertising and show that the conclusion may be reversed when ads are ranked based on the product of stochastic quality scores and bid amounts rather than solely on the bids or on the product of bids and deterministic quality scores. Moreover, the expected revenue in the pure-strategy equilibrium of the generalized first-price auction may substantially exceed that of the generalized second-price auction, although under some conditions, the relation may also be reversed. History: This paper has been accepted for the Mathematics of Operations Research Special Issue on Market Design.

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APA

Ostrovsky, M., & Skrzypacz, A. (2026). Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction. Mathematics of Operations Research. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2024.0730

Vancouver

Ostrovsky M, Skrzypacz A. Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction. Mathematics of Operations Research. 2026. doi:10.1287/moor.2024.0730

BibTeX
@article{Ostrovsky2026,
  author = {Ostrovsky, Michael and Skrzypacz, Andrzej},
  title = {Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction},
  journal = {Mathematics of Operations Research},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1287/moor.2024.0730}
}
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