Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction
Mathematics of Operations Research · 10.11.2026
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2024.0730 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematics of Operations Research, online erschienen am 10.11.2026. Verfasst von Michael Ostrovsky und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 18 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We revisit the classic result on the (non-)existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the generalized first-price auction for sponsored search advertising and show that the conclusion may be reversed when ads are ranked based on the product of stochastic quality scores and bid amounts rather than solely on the bids or on the product of bids and deterministic quality scores. Moreover, the expected revenue in the pure-strategy equilibrium of the generalized first-price auction may substantially exceed that of the generalized second-price auction, although under some conditions, the relation may also be reversed. History: This paper has been accepted for the Mathematics of Operations Research Special Issue on Market Design.
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APA
Ostrovsky, M., & Skrzypacz, A. (2026). Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction. Mathematics of Operations Research. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2024.0730
Vancouver
Ostrovsky M, Skrzypacz A. Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction. Mathematics of Operations Research. 2026. doi:10.1287/moor.2024.0730
BibTeX
@article{Ostrovsky2026,
author = {Ostrovsky, Michael and Skrzypacz, Andrzej},
title = {Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction},
journal = {Mathematics of Operations Research},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1287/moor.2024.0730}
}
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