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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust

Jonathan C. Rutledge

TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology · 2018

DOI: 10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology, 2018. Verfasst von Jonathan C. Rutledge. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument.

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APA

Rutledge, J. C. (2018). Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust. TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology. https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303

Vancouver

Rutledge JC. Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust. TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology. 2018. doi:10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303

BibTeX
@article{Rutledge2018,
  author = {Rutledge, Jonathan C.},
  title = {Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust},
  journal = {TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303}
}
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