Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal
Episteme · 2024-03 · 21 (1) · 34-49
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2020.49 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 23.12.2020. Verfasst von Katherine Dormandy. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 19-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 26 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
What is epistemic self-trust? There is a tension in the way in which prominent accounts answer this question. Many construe epistemic trust in oneself as no more than reliance on our sub-personal cognitive faculties. Yet many accounts – often the same ones – construe epistemic trust in others as a normatively laden attitude directed at persons whom we expect to care about our epistemic needs. Is epistemic self-trust really so different from epistemic trust in others? I argue that it is not. We certainly do rely on our cognitive faculties to achieve epistemic ends; but I argue that we also have the normatively rich sort of epistemic trust in ourselves. Moreover, there is a theoretical need for this normatively rich notion of epistemic self-trust: positing it yields the best account of how we secure important epistemic goods, including knowledge and recognition as knowers. I argue this by giving an account of epistemic trust in others and showing that it can be generalized to epistemic trust in oneself.
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APA
Dormandy, K. (2024). Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal. Episteme, 21(1), 34-49. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.49
Vancouver
Dormandy K. Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal. Episteme. 2024;21(1):34-49. doi:10.1017/epi.2020.49
BibTeX
@article{Dormandy2024,
author = {Dormandy, Katherine},
title = {Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal},
journal = {Episteme},
year = {2024},
volume = {21},
number = {1},
pages = {34--49},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2020.49}
}
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