Insider Trading Restrictions and Informed Trading in Peer Stocks
Management Science · 2025-03 · 71 (3) · 2390-2412
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.02907 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Management Science, 2025-03. Verfasst von Prachi Deuskar und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 58 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Using a uniquely constructed data set of trades by corporate insiders in all stocks, we find that, after insider trading regulations become stricter, insiders are 20% more likely to trade in peer stocks and that such trades become more profitable. The increase in both the probability and profitability of peer-stock trades is driven by the insider’s information that is fungible to industry peers. Stricter insider trading laws are designed to improve liquidity and price informativeness in capital markets. We show that peer trading dampens these intended benefits of the insider trading regulation. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Funding: This work was supported by NSE-NYU Stern Initiative on the Study of Indian Financial Markets. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02907 .
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APA
Deuskar, P., Khatri, A., & Sunder, J. (2025). Insider Trading Restrictions and Informed Trading in Peer Stocks. Management Science, 71(3), 2390-2412. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02907
Vancouver
Deuskar P, Khatri A, Sunder J. Insider Trading Restrictions and Informed Trading in Peer Stocks. Management Science. 2025;71(3):2390-2412. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.02907
BibTeX
@article{Deuskar2025,
author = {Deuskar, Prachi and Khatri, Aditi and Sunder, Jayanthi},
title = {Insider Trading Restrictions and Informed Trading in Peer Stocks},
journal = {Management Science},
year = {2025},
volume = {71},
number = {3},
pages = {2390--2412},
doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2022.02907}
}
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