Legal Risk and Insider Trading
The Journal of Finance · 2024-02 · 79 (1) · 305-355
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13299 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 21.12.2023. Verfasst von MARCIN KACPERCZYK und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 62-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Do illegal insiders internalize legal risk? We address this question with hand‐collected data from 530 SEC (the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) investigations. Using two plausibly exogenous shocks to expected penalties, we show that insiders trade less aggressively and earlier and concentrate on tips of greater value when facing a higher risk. The results match the predictions of a model where an insider internalizes the impact of trades on prices and the likelihood of prosecution and anticipates penalties in proportion to trade profits. Our findings lend support to the effectiveness of U.S. regulations' deterrence and the long‐standing hypothesis that insider trading enforcement can hamper price informativeness.
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APA
KACPERCZYK, M., & PAGNOTTA, E. S. (2024). Legal Risk and Insider Trading. The Journal of Finance, 79(1), 305-355. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13299
Vancouver
KACPERCZYK M, PAGNOTTA ES. Legal Risk and Insider Trading. The Journal of Finance. 2024;79(1):305-355. doi:10.1111/jofi.13299
BibTeX
@article{KACPERCZYK2024,
author = {KACPERCZYK, MARCIN and PAGNOTTA, EMILIANO S.},
title = {Legal Risk and Insider Trading},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2024},
volume = {79},
number = {1},
pages = {305--355},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13299}
}
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