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Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism

Massimiliano Vignolo

Studia Philosophica Estonica · 2008

DOI: 10.12697/spe.2008.1.1.05 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Studia Philosophica Estonica, 2008. Verfasst von Massimiliano Vignolo.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deflationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. This brings out an interesting consequence since mostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception of meaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that deflationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism.

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APA

Vignolo, M. (2008). Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism. Studia Philosophica Estonica. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.1.05

Vancouver

Vignolo M. Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism. Studia Philosophica Estonica. 2008. doi:10.12697/spe.2008.1.1.05

BibTeX
@article{Vignolo2008,
  author = {Vignolo, Massimiliano},
  title = {Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism},
  journal = {Studia Philosophica Estonica},
  year = {2008},
  doi = {10.12697/spe.2008.1.1.05}
}
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