Truth Deflationism, Meaning Deflationism, and Counterfactual Blindness
Analysis · 31.07.2026
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anag061 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analysis, online erschienen am 31.07.2026. Verfasst von Jared Warren.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Both proponents and critics of Truth Deflationism have argued that, according to Truth Deflationism, truth is a use-independent feature of sentences. And this seems to entail a form of Meaning Deflationism, according to which deflationists can completely avoid metasemantic questions. Here I show that the only arguments for Use-Independence from Truth Deflationism require what I call Counterfactual Blindness: they are blind to the counterconventional reading of standard counterfactuals. I close by suggesting that Counterfactual Blindness also leads to gridlock in some other philosophical debates, including debates over quasi-realism in metaethics and two-dimensionalism in the philosophy of language and mind.
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APA
Warren, J. (2026). Truth Deflationism, Meaning Deflationism, and Counterfactual Blindness. Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anag061
Vancouver
Warren J. Truth Deflationism, Meaning Deflationism, and Counterfactual Blindness. Analysis. 2026. doi:10.1093/analys/anag061
BibTeX
@article{Warren2026,
author = {Warren, Jared},
title = {Truth Deflationism, Meaning Deflationism, and Counterfactual Blindness},
journal = {Analysis},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/analys/anag061}
}
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