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Optimal Design of Market Access

Takuro Yamashita, Shuguang Zhu

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.08.2026 · 18 (3) · 1-38

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240324 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.08.2026. Verfasst von Takuro Yamashita und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 24 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study a data provider's problem of optimally designing and selling marketing lists that enable a retailer with private types to access consumers with heterogeneous characteristics. When virtual values satisfy a particular form of convexity (named boundary dominance), under certain regularity conditions, the optimal mechanism comprises fully revealing marketing lists, irrespective of whether the retailer's types are vertically or horizontally ordered. Moreover, in the vertical case, the optimal mechanism allows a simple “fixed-price” implementation. In the horizontal case, it exhibits no-exclusion and rotation properties. Conversely, if boundary dominance is violated, the optimal mechanism may not be fully revealing. (JEL D82, L81, M31)

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APA

Yamashita, T., & Zhu, S. (2026). Optimal Design of Market Access. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(3), 1-38. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20240324

Vancouver

Yamashita T, Zhu S. Optimal Design of Market Access. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(3):1-38. doi:10.1257/mic.20240324

BibTeX
@article{Yamashita2026,
  author = {Yamashita, Takuro and Zhu, Shuguang},
  title = {Optimal Design of Market Access},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1--38},
  doi = {10.1257/mic.20240324}
}
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