Optimal Design of Market Access
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.08.2026 · 18 (3) · 1-38
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240324 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.08.2026. Verfasst von Takuro Yamashita und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 24 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study a data provider's problem of optimally designing and selling marketing lists that enable a retailer with private types to access consumers with heterogeneous characteristics. When virtual values satisfy a particular form of convexity (named boundary dominance), under certain regularity conditions, the optimal mechanism comprises fully revealing marketing lists, irrespective of whether the retailer's types are vertically or horizontally ordered. Moreover, in the vertical case, the optimal mechanism allows a simple “fixed-price” implementation. In the horizontal case, it exhibits no-exclusion and rotation properties. Conversely, if boundary dominance is violated, the optimal mechanism may not be fully revealing. (JEL D82, L81, M31)
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APA
Yamashita, T., & Zhu, S. (2026). Optimal Design of Market Access. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(3), 1-38. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20240324
Vancouver
Yamashita T, Zhu S. Optimal Design of Market Access. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(3):1-38. doi:10.1257/mic.20240324
BibTeX
@article{Yamashita2026,
author = {Yamashita, Takuro and Zhu, Shuguang},
title = {Optimal Design of Market Access},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {3},
pages = {1--38},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20240324}
}
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