Optimal Taxation and Market Power
American Economic Review · 01.01.2026 · 116 (1) · 119-163
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211445 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.01.2026. Verfasst von Jan Eeckhout und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 76 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Should optimal income taxation change when firms have market power? We analyze how the planner can optimally tax labor income of workers and profits of entrepreneurs. We derive optimal tax rates that depend on markups and identify four distinct components: the Mirrleesian incentive effect, the Pigouvian tax correction of the negative externality of market power, redistribution through altered factor prices, and reallocation of output toward the most productive firms. We quantify the optimal tax for the US economy and provide concrete proposals how to use income taxation to redistribute income while incentivizing production in the presence of market power. (JEL D24, D31, D43, H21, H23, H24, H25)
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APA
Eeckhout, J., Fu, C., Li, W., & Weng, X. (2026). Optimal Taxation and Market Power. American Economic Review, 116(1), 119-163. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211445
Vancouver
Eeckhout J, Fu C, Li W, Weng X. Optimal Taxation and Market Power. American Economic Review. 2026;116(1):119-163. doi:10.1257/aer.20211445
BibTeX
@article{Eeckhout2026,
author = {Eeckhout, Jan and Fu, Chunyang and Li, Wenjian and Weng, Xi},
title = {Optimal Taxation and Market Power},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {116},
number = {1},
pages = {119--163},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20211445}
}
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