The Organization of Innovation: Incomplete Contracts and the Outsourcing Decision
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2026 · 18 (2) · 56-109
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240053 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2026. Verfasst von Thomas Jungbauer und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 50 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Why do firms outsource research and development (R&D) for some products while conducting R&D in-house for similar ones? An innovating firm risks cannibalizing its existing products. The more profitable these products, the more the firm wants to limit cannibalization. We apply this logic to the organization of R&D by introducing a novel theoretical model in which developing in-house provides the firm more control over the new product’s location in product space. An empirical analysis of our testable predictions using pharmaceutical data concerning patents, patent expiration, and outsourcing at various stages of the R&D process supports our theoretical approach. (JEL D21, D22, L22, L24, L65, O31, O34)
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APA
Jungbauer, T., Nicholson, S., Pan, J., Waldman, M., & Wang, L. X. (2026). The Organization of Innovation: Incomplete Contracts and the Outsourcing Decision. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(2), 56-109. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20240053
Vancouver
Jungbauer T, Nicholson S, Pan J, Waldman M, Wang LX. The Organization of Innovation: Incomplete Contracts and the Outsourcing Decision. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(2):56-109. doi:10.1257/mic.20240053
BibTeX
@article{Jungbauer2026,
author = {Jungbauer, Thomas and Nicholson, Sean and Pan, June and Waldman, Michael and Wang, Lucy Xiaolu},
title = {The Organization of Innovation: Incomplete Contracts and the Outsourcing Decision},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {56--109},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20240053}
}
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