The Paradox of Innovation Nondisclosure: Evidence from Licensing Contracts
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 01.10.2024 · 16 (4) · 220-256
DOI: 10.1257/app.20230046 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, erschienen am 01.10.2024. Verfasst von Gaurav Kankanhalli und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 65 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Innovative firms must trade off disclosing to investors and maintaining secrecy from competitors. We study this trade-off in a sample of IP licenses mandatorily disclosed by US public firms, whose contents can be temporarily redacted. Hand classifying the redacted information, we find that firms with valuable IP in competitive markets redact IP information more often. Markets react positively to the redaction of IP information, consistent with theoretical predictions rationalizing a separating equilibrium in which nondisclosure signals more valuable IP. Our results suggest that credible nondisclosure partially resolves information frictions for innovative public firms when facilitated by sophisticated investors. (JEL D22, D82, G38, L24, O32, O34)
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APA
Kankanhalli, G., Kwan, A., & Merkley, K. (2024). The Paradox of Innovation Nondisclosure: Evidence from Licensing Contracts. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 16(4), 220-256. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20230046
Vancouver
Kankanhalli G, Kwan A, Merkley K. The Paradox of Innovation Nondisclosure: Evidence from Licensing Contracts. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 2024;16(4):220-256. doi:10.1257/app.20230046
BibTeX
@article{Kankanhalli2024,
author = {Kankanhalli, Gaurav and Kwan, Alan and Merkley, Kenneth},
title = {The Paradox of Innovation Nondisclosure: Evidence from Licensing Contracts},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
year = {2024},
volume = {16},
number = {4},
pages = {220--256},
doi = {10.1257/app.20230046}
}
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