Dynamic Preference “Reversals” and Time Inconsistency
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2026 · 18 (2) · 426-468
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230120 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2026. Verfasst von Philipp Strack und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 61 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the possibility of identifying time-inconsistent preferences in empirical designs where preferences are elicited in advance at time 0 and then again at time 1, after the agent receives additional information. For single-peaked preferences, time consistency is rejected only when the time-1 ranking between a pair of alternatives is always the reverse of the time-0 ranking. We establish variations and generalizations of this result. Since such stark reversals are rarely observed, choice-revision designs require stronger identification assumptions than perhaps previously appreciated. But we show that time inconsistency is identifiable in environments where preferences over alternatives can be “priced out.” (JEL D11, D15, D83, D86)
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APA
Strack, P., & Taubinsky, D. (2026). Dynamic Preference “Reversals” and Time Inconsistency. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(2), 426-468. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20230120
Vancouver
Strack P, Taubinsky D. Dynamic Preference “Reversals” and Time Inconsistency. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(2):426-468. doi:10.1257/mic.20230120
BibTeX
@article{Strack2026,
author = {Strack, Philipp and Taubinsky, Dmitry},
title = {Dynamic Preference “Reversals” and Time Inconsistency},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {426--468},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20230120}
}
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