Time inconsistency of a central bank in a monetary search model with agent’s time inconsistency
Journal of Economics · 2026-09 · 147 (3)
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-026-00925-5 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 14.07.2026. Verfasst von Daiki Maeda. Die Arbeit nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Zengin Foundation For Studies On Economics And Finance.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I incorporate time-inconsistent preferences under hyperbolic discounting into the monetary search model following Lagos and Wright (2005) and use it to analyze two types of economies. One economy consists of sophisticated agents who understand their time inconsistency, whereas the other consists of naïve agents who do not understand their time inconsistency. I extend previous analyses of this topic by considering two monetary policy rules: inflation targeting under which the target variable is the inflation rate and nominal growth rate targeting under which the target variable is the growth rate of gross domestic product. Through this analysis, I show that inflation targeting can be a time-inconsistent monetary policy rule in the economy consisting of naïve agents even if there is no uncertainty.
Förderung
- Zengin Foundation For Studies On Economics And Finance
Zitieren
APA
Maeda, D. (2026). Time inconsistency of a central bank in a monetary search model with agent’s time inconsistency. Journal of Economics, 147(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-026-00925-5
Vancouver
Maeda D. Time inconsistency of a central bank in a monetary search model with agent’s time inconsistency. Journal of Economics. 2026;147(3). doi:10.1007/s00712-026-00925-5
BibTeX
@article{Maeda2026,
author = {Maeda, Daiki},
title = {Time inconsistency of a central bank in a monetary search model with agent’s time inconsistency},
journal = {Journal of Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {147},
number = {3},
doi = {10.1007/s00712-026-00925-5}
}
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