Reference Pricing as a Deterrent to Entry: Evidence from the European Pharmaceutical Market
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2023 · 15 (2) · 345-383
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210053 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2023. Verfasst von Luca Maini und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 21-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 60 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
External reference pricing (ERP), the practice of benchmarking domestic drug prices to foreign prices, generates an incentive for firms to withhold products from low-income countries. Using a novel moment inequality approach, we estimate a structural model to measure how ERP policies affect access to innovative drugs across Europe. We find that ERP increases entry delays in eight low-income European countries by up to one year per drug. The European Union could remove these delays without replacing ERP by compensating firms through lump-sum transfers at the cost of around €18 million per drug. (JEL L13, L51, L65)
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APA
Maini, L., & Pammolli, F. (2023). Reference Pricing as a Deterrent to Entry: Evidence from the European Pharmaceutical Market. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(2), 345-383. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210053
Vancouver
Maini L, Pammolli F. Reference Pricing as a Deterrent to Entry: Evidence from the European Pharmaceutical Market. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2023;15(2):345-383. doi:10.1257/mic.20210053
BibTeX
@article{Maini2023,
author = {Maini, Luca and Pammolli, Fabio},
title = {Reference Pricing as a Deterrent to Entry: Evidence from the European Pharmaceutical Market},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2023},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
pages = {345--383},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20210053}
}
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