Politics and entry deterrence: Evidence from China's industrial land market
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · 2024-08 · 33 (3) · 686-705
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12591 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, online erschienen am 22.03.2024. Verfasst von Chunyang Wang. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 55 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines one million land transactions and firm census data sets to determine the effect of market concentration on entry deterrence in China from 2006 to 2013. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index leads to a one standard deviation decrease in local government‐designated industrial land sales to nonlocal firms and to a 2.9 standard deviation increase in land cost. Further evidence suggests that firms with high market power lobby their local governments to deter the entry of nonlocal firms.
Zitieren
APA
Wang, C. (2024). Politics and entry deterrence: Evidence from China's industrial land market. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 33(3), 686-705. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12591
Vancouver
Wang C. Politics and entry deterrence: Evidence from China's industrial land market. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 2024;33(3):686-705. doi:10.1111/jems.12591
BibTeX
@article{Wang2024,
author = {Wang, Chunyang},
title = {Politics and entry deterrence: Evidence from China's industrial land market},
journal = {Journal of Economics & Management Strategy},
year = {2024},
volume = {33},
number = {3},
pages = {686--705},
doi = {10.1111/jems.12591}
}
EUVIMED