Second-Degree Price Discrimination by a Two-Sided Monopoly Platform
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2022 · 14 (2) · 322-369
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190369 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2022. Verfasst von Doh-Shin Jeon und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 16-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 41 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The incentive constraints of the agents on the value creation side may be in conflict with internalizing externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal. Even without such conflict between the two sides, pooling may be optimal due to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agents diverge from those of the average agents on the value capture side. We perform a welfare analysis of price discrimination and show that prohibiting price discrimination improves welfare when there is a strong conflict between the two sides. (JEL D42, D62, D82, L12, L82)
Zitieren
APA
Jeon, D., Kim, B., & Menicucci, D. (2022). Second-Degree Price Discrimination by a Two-Sided Monopoly Platform. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14(2), 322-369. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190369
Vancouver
Jeon D, Kim B, Menicucci D. Second-Degree Price Discrimination by a Two-Sided Monopoly Platform. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2022;14(2):322-369. doi:10.1257/mic.20190369
BibTeX
@article{Jeon2022,
author = {Jeon, Doh-Shin and Kim, Byung-Cheol and Menicucci, Domenico},
title = {Second-Degree Price Discrimination by a Two-Sided Monopoly Platform},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2022},
volume = {14},
number = {2},
pages = {322--369},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20190369}
}
EUVIMED