Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.11.2021 · 13 (4) · 261-299
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180336 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.11.2021. Verfasst von Florian Engl und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 9-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 82 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects. (JEL C92, D02, D83, D91, H41)
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APA
Engl, F., Riedl, A., & Weber, R. (2021). Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13(4), 261-299. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180336
Vancouver
Engl F, Riedl A, Weber R. Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2021;13(4):261-299. doi:10.1257/mic.20180336
BibTeX
@article{Engl2021,
author = {Engl, Florian and Riedl, Arno and Weber, Roberto},
title = {Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2021},
volume = {13},
number = {4},
pages = {261--299},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20180336}
}
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