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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Worker‐side discrimination: Beliefs and preferences

Md Moshi Ul Alam, Mehreen Mookerjee, Sanket Roy

Quantitative Economics · 2026 · 17 (4) · 1033-1102

DOI: 10.3982/qe2409 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Quantitative Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Md Moshi Ul Alam und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 99 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

When agents choose among options with unobserved attributes to maximize expected utility, their choices conflate preferences with beliefs about those attributes. We develop a novel theory‐driven identification strategy for such settings, showing that compensating differentials separately identify beliefs from preferences. Noting that workers' preferences and beliefs shape labor market outcomes, yet remain understudied, we apply our method to provide the first evidence on the distribution of workers' preferences over manager gender, and their beliefs about managers' mentoring ability. In the absence of information on manager mentoring ability, workers are indifferent to manager gender. However, upon receiving information on manager mentorship ability, workers prefer to work for female managers, willing to forgo 1.7% of average annual wages. Hence, absent additional information, workers believe female managers are worse mentors (1.6% wage equivalent). Nonparametric estimates of the distributions reveal that 76% prefer female managers with mentoring information, and 67% believe male managers are better mentors absent information. Machine learning algorithms show that individuals with higher education are less likely to hold such beliefs. These beliefs are primarily driven by perceptions that women are less competent. Evidence suggests these beliefs are biased, highlighting scope for information‐based policy interventions.

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APA

Alam, M. M. U., Mookerjee, M., & Roy, S. (2026). Worker‐side discrimination: Beliefs and preferences. Quantitative Economics, 17(4), 1033-1102. https://doi.org/10.3982/qe2409

Vancouver

Alam MMU, Mookerjee M, Roy S. Worker‐side discrimination: Beliefs and preferences. Quantitative Economics. 2026;17(4):1033-1102. doi:10.3982/qe2409

BibTeX
@article{Alam2026,
  author = {Alam, Md Moshi Ul and Mookerjee, Mehreen and Roy, Sanket},
  title = {Worker‐side discrimination: Beliefs and preferences},
  journal = {Quantitative Economics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {17},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1033--1102},
  doi = {10.3982/qe2409}
}
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