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Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets

Gleb Romanyuk, Alex Smolin

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2019 · 11 (2) · 250-276

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170154 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2019. Verfasst von Gleb Romanyuk und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 24-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 22 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and decide whether to accept incoming requests. The platform designs what buyer information the sellers observe before deciding to form a match. We show full information disclosure leads to a market failure because of excessive rejections by the sellers. If sellers are homogeneous, then coarse information policies are able to restore efficiency. If sellers are heterogeneous, then simple censorship policies are often constrained efficient as shown by a method of calculus of variations. (JEL C78, D82, D83)

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APA

Romanyuk, G., & Smolin, A. (2019). Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(2), 250-276. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170154

Vancouver

Romanyuk G, Smolin A. Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2019;11(2):250-276. doi:10.1257/mic.20170154

BibTeX
@article{Romanyuk2019,
  author = {Romanyuk, Gleb and Smolin, Alex},
  title = {Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {11},
  number = {2},
  pages = {250--276},
  doi = {10.1257/mic.20170154}
}
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