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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Security Design in Non-Exclusive Markets with Asymmetric Information

Vladimir Asriyan, Victoria Vanasco

Review of Economic Studies · 06.03.2024 · 91 (2) · 690-719

DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdad038 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economic Studies, online erschienen am 06.04.2023. Verfasst von Vladimir Asriyan und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 55 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, Severo Ochoa Programme, Centres of Excellence in R&D.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study the problem of a seller (e.g. a bank) who is privately informed about the quality of her asset and wants to exploit gains from trade with uninformed buyers (e.g. investors) by issuing securities backed by her asset cash flows. In our setting, buyers post menus of contracts to screen the seller, but the seller cannot commit to trade with only one buyer, i.e. markets are non-exclusive. We show that non-exclusive markets behave very differently from exclusive ones: (1) separating contracts are never part of equilibrium; (2) mispricing of claims faced by the seller is always greater than in exclusive markets; (3) there is always a semi-pooling equilibrium where all sellers issue the same debt contract priced at average-valuation, and sellers of low-quality assets issue remaining cash flows at low-valuation; (4) market liquidity can be higher or lower than in exclusive markets, but (5) the average quality of originated assets is always lower. Our model’s predictions are consistent with empirical evidence on the issuance and pricing of mortgage-backed securities, and we use the theory to evaluate recent reforms aimed at enhancing transparency and exclusivity in markets.

Förderung

  • Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
  • Severo Ochoa Programme
  • Centres of Excellence in R&D
  • Generalitat de Catalunya
  • CERCA and SGR Programme
  • Spanish State Research Agency
  • European Social Fund
  • European Research Council

Zitieren

APA

Asriyan, V., & Vanasco, V. (2024). Security Design in Non-Exclusive Markets with Asymmetric Information. Review of Economic Studies, 91(2), 690-719. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad038

Vancouver

Asriyan V, Vanasco V. Security Design in Non-Exclusive Markets with Asymmetric Information. Review of Economic Studies. 2024;91(2):690-719. doi:10.1093/restud/rdad038

BibTeX
@article{Asriyan2024,
  author = {Asriyan, Vladimir and Vanasco, Victoria},
  title = {Security Design in Non-Exclusive Markets with Asymmetric Information},
  journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {91},
  number = {2},
  pages = {690--719},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rdad038}
}
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