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Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems

John Kennes, Daniel Monte, Norovsambuu Tumennasan

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2019 · 11 (2) · 55-97

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170077 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2019. Verfasst von John Kennes und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 23 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools’ priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation by examining all the different matchings that a single player can induce. (JEL C78, I21, I28)

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APA

Kennes, J., Monte, D., & Tumennasan, N. (2019). Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(2), 55-97. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170077

Vancouver

Kennes J, Monte D, Tumennasan N. Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2019;11(2):55-97. doi:10.1257/mic.20170077

BibTeX
@article{Kennes2019,
  author = {Kennes, John and Monte, Daniel and Tumennasan, Norovsambuu},
  title = {Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {11},
  number = {2},
  pages = {55--97},
  doi = {10.1257/mic.20170077}
}
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