Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2019 · 11 (2) · 55-97
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170077 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2019. Verfasst von John Kennes und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 23 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools’ priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation by examining all the different matchings that a single player can induce. (JEL C78, I21, I28)
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APA
Kennes, J., Monte, D., & Tumennasan, N. (2019). Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(2), 55-97. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170077
Vancouver
Kennes J, Monte D, Tumennasan N. Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2019;11(2):55-97. doi:10.1257/mic.20170077
BibTeX
@article{Kennes2019,
author = {Kennes, John and Monte, Daniel and Tumennasan, Norovsambuu},
title = {Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2019},
volume = {11},
number = {2},
pages = {55--97},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20170077}
}
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