The Role of Admission Probabilities in the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: An Experimental Study
International Studies of Economics · 16.04.2026
DOI: 10.1002/ise3.70033 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Studies of Economics, online erschienen am 16.04.2026. Verfasst von Shuxian Hong und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 22 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Although students theoretically need not consider admission probabilities under strategy‐proof mechanisms in school choice problems, our study reveals a significant correlation between students' applications and their beliefs about admission probabilities in the deferred acceptance mechanism. Specifically, students believe they would have a higher probability of matching with the most preferred school if they rank it higher in the application list. Additionally, students tend to lower the rank of the most preferred school if they believe they have too low a probability of matching with it when reporting their true preferences. Students seem to give up the slim chances to be admitted to their most preferred schools and increase the probabilities of matching with the first listed schools in their application lists. Our findings contribute to understanding students' non‐truthful behavior in strategy‐proof mechanisms.
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APA
Hong, S., & Yang, Y. (2026). The Role of Admission Probabilities in the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: An Experimental Study. International Studies of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1002/ise3.70033
Vancouver
Hong S, Yang Y. The Role of Admission Probabilities in the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: An Experimental Study. International Studies of Economics. 2026. doi:10.1002/ise3.70033
BibTeX
@article{Hong2026,
author = {Hong, Shuxian and Yang, Yi},
title = {The Role of Admission Probabilities in the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: An Experimental Study},
journal = {International Studies of Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1002/ise3.70033}
}
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