Inflation Targeting under Fiscal Fragility
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · 01.04.2026 · 18 (2) · 292-331
DOI: 10.1257/mac.20230291 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, erschienen am 01.04.2026. Verfasst von Aloisio Araujo und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 42 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We propose a model to study an inflation-targeting regime under a high government debt burden. We assume that an altruistic policymaker chooses debt issuance, inflation, and public expenditure, while private agents dislike inflation and finance the government. We show that equilibrium inflation depends on debt level: (i) on-target when debt is low; (ii) above the target when debt is high; (iii) either above or on-target in between, a zone that we named fiscal fragility. Equilibrium inflation also depends on the target level: A higher target may improve welfare by preventing fiscal fragility and reducing debt-rollover costs. (JEL E31, E52, E62, E63, H63, O11, O23)
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APA
Araujo, A., Costa, V., Lins, P., Santos, R., & Valk, S. D. (2026). Inflation Targeting under Fiscal Fragility. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 18(2), 292-331. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20230291
Vancouver
Araujo A, Costa V, Lins P, Santos R, Valk SD. Inflation Targeting under Fiscal Fragility. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. 2026;18(2):292-331. doi:10.1257/mac.20230291
BibTeX
@article{Araujo2026,
author = {Araujo, Aloisio and Costa, Vitor and Lins, Paulo and Santos, Rafael and Valk, Serge de},
title = {Inflation Targeting under Fiscal Fragility},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {292--331},
doi = {10.1257/mac.20230291}
}
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