Equilibrium multiplicity and uniqueness under inflation targeting
Macroeconomic Dynamics · 2026 · 30
DOI: 10.1017/s1365100526101151 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Macroeconomic Dynamics, online erschienen am 25.06.2026. Verfasst von Alexandre B. Cunha. Die Arbeit nennt 40 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Macroeconomic models often have multiple equilibria. Nonetheless, a popular view on inflation targeting posits that this policy helps to coordinate agents’ expectations and actions. This paper provides a rationalization for this notion. I consider an infinitely repeated game, built on the Barro-Gordon model, in which the central bank incurs a fixed penalty whenever the actual inflation rate differs from the announced target and study how changes in the penalty impact its equilibria. I conclude that, in consonance with the aforementioned view, an inflation-targeting policy lessens the problem of equilibrium multiplicity. However, by itself, it is unlikely to achieve uniqueness.
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APA
Cunha, A. B. (2026). Equilibrium multiplicity and uniqueness under inflation targeting. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 30. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100526101151
Vancouver
Cunha AB. Equilibrium multiplicity and uniqueness under inflation targeting. Macroeconomic Dynamics. 2026;30. doi:10.1017/s1365100526101151
BibTeX
@article{Cunha2026,
author = {Cunha, Alexandre B.},
title = {Equilibrium multiplicity and uniqueness under inflation targeting},
journal = {Macroeconomic Dynamics},
year = {2026},
volume = {30},
doi = {10.1017/s1365100526101151}
}
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