Automation, Bargaining Power, and Labor Market Fluctuations
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · 2024-10-01 · 16 (4) · 311-349
DOI: 10.1257/mac.20220181 ↗At a glance
Journal article in American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, published on 2024-10-01. Written by Sylvain Leduc and 1 co-authors. Cited 12 times so far (Crossref); 42 references.
Abstract (original language)
We argue that the threat of automation weakens workers’ bargaining power in wage negotiations, dampening wage adjustments and amplifying unemployment fluctuations. We make this argument based on a business cycle model with labor market search frictions, generalized to incorporate automation decisions. In the model, procyclical automation threats create endogenous real wage rigidity that amplifies labor market fluctuations. The automation mechanism is consistent with empirical evidence. It is also quantitatively important for explaining the large volatilities of unemployment and vacancies relative to that of real wages, a puzzling observation through the lens of standard business cycle models. (JEL E13, E24, E32, J31, J63, J64)
Cite
APA
Leduc, S., & Liu, Z. (2024). Automation, Bargaining Power, and Labor Market Fluctuations. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 16(4), 311-349. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20220181
Vancouver
Leduc S, Liu Z. Automation, Bargaining Power, and Labor Market Fluctuations. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. 2024;16(4):311-349. doi:10.1257/mac.20220181
BibTeX
@article{Leduc2024,
author = {Leduc, Sylvain and Liu, Zheng},
title = {Automation, Bargaining Power, and Labor Market Fluctuations},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics},
year = {2024},
volume = {16},
number = {4},
pages = {311--349},
doi = {10.1257/mac.20220181}
}
EUVIMED