Why Whistleblowing Does Not Deter Collaborative Tax Evasion
Public Finance Review · 17.11.2026
DOI: 10.1177/10911421261500523 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Public Finance Review, online erschienen am 17.11.2026. Verfasst von Lilith Burgstaller und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 77 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Science Foundation of the University of Freiburg.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Does whistleblowing deter rule violations when such violations are believed to be common? We examine this question in an online experiment about collaborative tax evasion. We vary whether subjects can blow the whistle on their partner in crime and introduce a high-evasion environment by framing the social norm such that evasion is expected to be common. Our findings show that giving partners in crime the option to blow the whistle on their partner does not significantly deter collaborative tax evasion. Collaborative tax evasion significantly increases in a high-evasion environment compared to an unspecified norm environment, when whistleblowing is possible. This finding underlines that the norm environment is crucial for evasion and corroborates that whistleblowing is ineffective when both partners benefit from collaborative evasion. We offer several explanations for these findings.
Förderung
- Science Foundation of the University of Freiburg
Zitieren
APA
Burgstaller, L., & Pfeil, K. (2026). Why Whistleblowing Does Not Deter Collaborative Tax Evasion. Public Finance Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/10911421261500523
Vancouver
Burgstaller L, Pfeil K. Why Whistleblowing Does Not Deter Collaborative Tax Evasion. Public Finance Review. 2026. doi:10.1177/10911421261500523
BibTeX
@article{Burgstaller2026,
author = {Burgstaller, Lilith and Pfeil, Katharina},
title = {Why Whistleblowing Does Not Deter Collaborative Tax Evasion},
journal = {Public Finance Review},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1177/10911421261500523}
}
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