EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Does Cash Bail Deter Misconduct?

Aurélie Ouss, Megan Stevenson

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 01.07.2023 · 15 (3) · 150-182

DOI: 10.1257/app.20210349 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, erschienen am 01.07.2023. Verfasst von Aurélie Ouss und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 19-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Courts routinely use low cash bail as a financial incentive to ensure released defendants appear in court and abstain from crime. This can create burdens for defendants with little empirical evidence on its efficacy. We exploit a prosecutor-driven reform that led to a sharp reduction in low cash bail and pretrial supervision, with no effect on pretrial detention, to test whether such incentive mechanisms succeed at their intended purpose. We find no evidence that financial collateral has a deterrent effect on failure to appear or pretrial crime. This paper also contributes to the literature on legal actor discretion, showing that nonbinding reforms may have limited impact on jail populations. (JEL K41, K42)

Zitieren

APA

Ouss, A., & Stevenson, M. (2023). Does Cash Bail Deter Misconduct?. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 15(3), 150-182. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210349

Vancouver

Ouss A, Stevenson M. Does Cash Bail Deter Misconduct?. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 2023;15(3):150-182. doi:10.1257/app.20210349

BibTeX
@article{Ouss2023,
  author = {Ouss, Aurélie and Stevenson, Megan},
  title = {Does Cash Bail Deter Misconduct?},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {15},
  number = {3},
  pages = {150--182},
  doi = {10.1257/app.20210349}
}
Kostenlos starten →