Group incentives and rational voting
Journal of Theoretical Politics · 2017-04 · 29 (2) · 299-326
DOI: 10.1177/0951629816630439 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Theoretical Politics, online erschienen am 07.07.2016. Verfasst von Alastair Smith und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 65 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Our model describes competition between groups driven by the choices of self-interested voters within groups. Within a Poisson voting environment, parties observe aggregate support from groups and can allocate prizes or punishments to them. In a tournament style analysis, the model characterizes how contingent allocation of prizes based on relative levels of support affects equilibrium voting behavior. In addition to standard notions of pivotality, voters influence the distribution of prizes across groups. Such prize pivotality supports positive voter turnout even in non-competitive electoral settings. The analysis shows that competition for a prize awarded to the most supportive group is only stable when two groups actively support a party. However, competition among groups to avoid punishment is stable in environments with any number of groups. We conclude by examining implications for endogenous group formation and how politicians structure the allocation of rewards and punishments.
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APA
Smith, A., Mesquita, B. B. D., & LaGatta, T. (2017). Group incentives and rational voting. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 29(2), 299-326. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629816630439
Vancouver
Smith A, Mesquita BBD, LaGatta T. Group incentives and rational voting. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2017;29(2):299-326. doi:10.1177/0951629816630439
BibTeX
@article{Smith2017,
author = {Smith, Alastair and Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de and LaGatta, Tom},
title = {Group incentives and rational voting},
journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
year = {2017},
volume = {29},
number = {2},
pages = {299--326},
doi = {10.1177/0951629816630439}
}
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