Crossref
Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting
Journal of Economic Theory · 2026-05 · 234 · 106168
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106168 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economic Theory, 2026-05. Verfasst von Margarita Kirneva und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Université Paris Dauphine - PSL, Core Research for Evolutional Science and Technology, Agence Nationale de la Recherche.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kein Abstract verfügbar.
Förderung
- Université Paris Dauphine - PSL
- Core Research for Evolutional Science and Technology
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Zitieren
APA
Kirneva, M., & Núñez, M. (2026). Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting. Journal of Economic Theory, 234, 106168. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2026.106168
Vancouver
Kirneva M, Núñez M. Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting. Journal of Economic Theory. 2026;234:106168. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2026.106168
BibTeX
@article{Kirneva2026,
author = {Kirneva, Margarita and Núñez, Matías},
title = {Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {234},
pages = {106168},
doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2026.106168}
}
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