In Defense of (Kantian) Imperfect Duty
Journal of Moral Philosophy · 25.06.2026 · 1-32
DOI: 10.1163/17455243-bja10186 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Moral Philosophy, erschienen am 25.06.2026. Verfasst von Simon Hope.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper argues for three points. First ( very briefly): Kant’s criteria of perfect/imperfect duty should not be conflated with other perfect/imperfect distinctions. Second (less briefly): when you reflect on the duties you, as a human being, are under, you find reason to accept Kant’s distinction; it tracks important considerations. Third (and not at all briefly): the common objection to Kant’s distinction in modern philosophy—that it misclassifies some duties of aid—fails. I argue for this last point on two lines. I show that familiar arguments for reclassification face serious difficulties. I then attempt to undermine the assumption that “directed” duties are all, or almost all, of what matters.
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APA
Hope, S. (2026). In Defense of (Kantian) Imperfect Duty. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 1-32. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-bja10186
Vancouver
Hope S. In Defense of (Kantian) Imperfect Duty. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2026:1-32. doi:10.1163/17455243-bja10186
BibTeX
@article{Hope2026,
author = {Hope, Simon},
title = {In Defense of (Kantian) Imperfect Duty},
journal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--32},
doi = {10.1163/17455243-bja10186}
}
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