The Source of Epistemic Normativity: In Defense of a Kantian View
Episteme · 13.04.2026 · 1-22
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2026.10111 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 13.04.2026. Verfasst von Martin Grajner. Die Arbeit nennt 58 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
What grounds epistemic normativity? Or, in other words, why should agents follow epistemic norms? A popular view about the source of epistemic normativity is instrumentalism. This view holds that epistemic norms gain their authority by being conducive to other things we place value in, such as survival or practical reasoning. In this paper, I explore an alternative view, which is inspired by Christine Korsgaard’s account of the source of moral normativity. This view claims that the authority of epistemic norms is grounded in the self-identities of agents and thereby ultimately in the value of humanity. I will argue that the account sketched in this paper enjoys crucial advantages over alternative accounts that have been proposed in recent literature – in particular those that develop Kant-inspired accounts of epistemic normativity.
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APA
Grajner, M. (2026). The Source of Epistemic Normativity: In Defense of a Kantian View. Episteme, 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2026.10111
Vancouver
Grajner M. The Source of Epistemic Normativity: In Defense of a Kantian View. Episteme. 2026:1-22. doi:10.1017/epi.2026.10111
BibTeX
@article{Grajner2026,
author = {Grajner, Martin},
title = {The Source of Epistemic Normativity: In Defense of a Kantian View},
journal = {Episteme},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--22},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2026.10111}
}
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