Rethinking the Person-Affecting Principle
Journal of Moral Philosophy · 11.08.2015 · 12 (4) · 428-461
DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01204004 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Moral Philosophy, erschienen am 11.08.2015. Verfasst von Jacob Ross. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 17-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 5 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In Rethinking the Good , Larry Temkin argues for a principle that he calls the Narrow Person-Affecting View. In its simplest formulation, this principle states that a first outcome can be better than a second outcome only if there is someone who fares better in the first outcome than in the second. Temkin argues that this kind of principle gives us reason to reject the Transitivity Thesis, according to which, if A is better than B, and B is better than C, then A must be better than C. In this paper, I argue that the various formulations which Temkin has offered of the Narrow Person-Affecting View all face serious problems. I then propose an alternative view that captures the spirit of Temkin’s formulations while avoiding their difficulties. I conclude by arguing that, even if we accept such a person-affecting view, we needn’t reject the Transitivity Thesis.
Zitieren
APA
Ross, J. (2015). Rethinking the Person-Affecting Principle. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 12(4), 428-461. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-01204004
Vancouver
Ross J. Rethinking the Person-Affecting Principle. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2015;12(4):428-461. doi:10.1163/17455243-01204004
BibTeX
@article{Ross2015,
author = {Ross, Jacob},
title = {Rethinking the Person-Affecting Principle},
journal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy},
year = {2015},
volume = {12},
number = {4},
pages = {428--461},
doi = {10.1163/17455243-01204004}
}
EUVIMED