A Fission Problem for Person-Affecting Views
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · 02.03.2026 · 13
DOI: 10.3998/ergo.9268 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 02.03.2026. Verfasst von Elliott Thornley. Die Arbeit nennt 75 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
On person-affecting views in population ethics, the moral import of a person’s welfare depends on that person’s temporal or modal status. These views typically imply that—all else equal—we’re never required to create extra people, or to act in ways that increase the probability of extra people coming into existence. In this paper, I use Parfit-style fission cases to construct a dilemma for person-affecting views: either they forfeit their seeming-advantages and face fission analogues of the problems faced by their rival impersonal views, or else they turn out to be not so person-affecting after all. In light of this dilemma, the attractions of person-affecting views largely evaporate. What remains are the problems unique to them.
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APA
Thornley, E. (2026). A Fission Problem for Person-Affecting Views. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 13(0). https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.9268
Vancouver
Thornley E. A Fission Problem for Person-Affecting Views. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 2026;13(0). doi:10.3998/ergo.9268
BibTeX
@article{Thornley2026,
author = {Thornley, Elliott},
title = {A Fission Problem for Person-Affecting Views},
journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {13},
number = {0},
doi = {10.3998/ergo.9268}
}
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