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EXPRESS: Slim Shading in Ad Auctions: Adjustment of Bidding Strategies to First-Price Rules

Robert Zeithammer, Miguel Alcobendas

Journal of Marketing Research · 16.11.2026

DOI: 10.1177/00222437261511019 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Marketing Research, online erschienen am 16.11.2026. Verfasst von Robert Zeithammer und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study how bidders adjusted to a switch from second-price to first-price auction rules on a large online advertising exchange. Under first-price rules, bidders should strategically reduce (“shade”) their bids. To assess whether observed bid reductions were sufficient given the competition each bidder faced, we develop a nonparametric estimator of a lower bound on the valuation underlying each bid. The estimator relies on localized measures of competition and does not require assumptions of bidder symmetry, valuation independence, or equilibrium bidding. Applying the method to more than 40 million auctions involving eight major demand-side platforms, we find pervasive insufficient bid shading after the switch. The implied lower bounds on valuations remain substantially above pre-switch levels for at least three months after the transition, indicating that none of the bidders we study shaded sufficiently. This finding is robust to alternative definitions of local competition, richer conditioning information, and variations in the assumptions underlying the estimator. The results suggest that adjustment to major auction-design changes can be surprisingly slow even among sophisticated algorithmic bidders, with implications for marketplace design and the interpretation of short-run “A/B test” experiments.

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APA

Zeithammer, R., & Alcobendas, M. (2026). EXPRESS: Slim Shading in Ad Auctions: Adjustment of Bidding Strategies to First-Price Rules. Journal of Marketing Research. https://doi.org/10.1177/00222437261511019

Vancouver

Zeithammer R, Alcobendas M. EXPRESS: Slim Shading in Ad Auctions: Adjustment of Bidding Strategies to First-Price Rules. Journal of Marketing Research. 2026. doi:10.1177/00222437261511019

BibTeX
@article{Zeithammer2026,
  author = {Zeithammer, Robert and Alcobendas, Miguel},
  title = {EXPRESS: Slim Shading in Ad Auctions: Adjustment of Bidding Strategies to First-Price Rules},
  journal = {Journal of Marketing Research},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1177/00222437261511019}
}
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