Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2019-05-31 · 7 (2) · 1-19
DOI: 10.1145/3340232 ↗At a glance
Journal article in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, published online on 2019-07-18. Written by Joseph Y. Halpern and 1 co-authors. Cited 6 times so far (Crossref); 17 references. Funded by: Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Microsoft Research, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.
Abstract (original language)
We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games (Halpern and Pass 2015), where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider two notions of sequential equilibrium. One is an ex ante notion, where a player chooses his strategy before the game starts and is committed to it, but chooses it in such a way that it remains optimal even off the equilibrium path. The second is an interim notion, where a player can reconsider at each information set whether he is doing the “right” thing, and if not, can change his strategy. The two notions agree in games of perfect recall, but not in games of imperfect recall. Although the interim notion seems more appealing, in a companion article (Halpern and Pass 2016), we argue that there are some deep conceptual problems with it in standard games of imperfect recall. We show that the conceptual problems largely disappear in the computational setting. Moreover, in this setting, under natural assumptions, the two notions coincide.
Funding
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- Microsoft Research
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Army Research Office
- National Science Foundation
Cite
APA
Halpern, J. Y., & Pass, R. (2019). Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(2), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1145/3340232
Vancouver
Halpern JY, Pass R. Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2019;7(2):1-19. doi:10.1145/3340232
BibTeX
@article{Halpern2019,
author = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Pass, Rafael},
title = {Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
year = {2019},
volume = {7},
number = {2},
pages = {1--19},
doi = {10.1145/3340232}
}
EUVIMED