On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2013
DOI: 10.1145/2465769.2465775 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2013. Verfasst von Elias Koutsoupias und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 14 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Seventh Framework Programme, Division of Computing and Communication Foundations, ESF-NSRF research program Thales.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals; in this sense, our model lies at the intersection of prior-free mechanism design and secretary problems. Our goal is to design auctions that are constant competitive with F (2) . We give a generic reduction that transforms any offline auction to an online one with only a loss of a factor of 2 in the competitive ratio. We also present some natural auctions, both randomized and deterministic, and study their competitive ratio. Our analysis reveals some interesting connections of one of these auctions with RSOP.
Förderung
- Seventh Framework Programme
- Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
- ESF-NSRF research program Thales
Zitieren
APA
Koutsoupias, E., & Pierrakos, G. (2013). On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. https://doi.org/10.1145/2465769.2465775
Vancouver
Koutsoupias E, Pierrakos G. On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2013. doi:10.1145/2465769.2465775
BibTeX
@article{Koutsoupias2013,
author = {Koutsoupias, Elias and Pierrakos, George},
title = {On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
year = {2013},
doi = {10.1145/2465769.2465775}
}
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