Would Order‐By‐Order Auctions Be Competitive?
The Journal of Finance · 2025-08 · 80 (4) · 1879-1927
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13449 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 13.05.2025. Verfasst von THOMAS ERNST und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 9-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We model two methods of executing segregated retail orders: brokers' routing, whereby brokers allocate orders using the market maker's overall performance, and order‐by‐order auctions, where market makers bid on individual orders, a recent U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proposal. Order‐by‐order auctions improve allocative efficiency, but face a winner's curse reducing retail investor welfare, particularly when liquidity is limited. Additional market participants competing for retail orders fail to improve total efficiency and investor welfare when entrants possess information superior to incumbent wholesalers. Our results hold when new entrants are less informed or the information structure differs. We also examine the cross‐subsidization of brokers' routing.
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APA
ERNST, T., SPATT, C., & SUN, J. (2025). Would Order‐By‐Order Auctions Be Competitive?. The Journal of Finance, 80(4), 1879-1927. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13449
Vancouver
ERNST T, SPATT C, SUN J. Would Order‐By‐Order Auctions Be Competitive?. The Journal of Finance. 2025;80(4):1879-1927. doi:10.1111/jofi.13449
BibTeX
@article{ERNST2025,
author = {ERNST, THOMAS and SPATT, CHESTER and SUN, JIAN},
title = {Would Order‐By‐Order Auctions Be Competitive?},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2025},
volume = {80},
number = {4},
pages = {1879--1927},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13449}
}
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