Selling in Exclusive Markets
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2013
DOI: 10.1145/2465769.2465772 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2013. Verfasst von Anna R. Karlin und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Yahoo! Research, Division of Computing and Communication Foundations.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We consider prior-free benchmarks in non-matroid settings. In particular, we show that a very desirable benchmark proposed by Hartline and Roughgarden is too strong, in the sense that no truthful mechanism can compete with it even in a very simple non-matroid setting where there are two exclusive markets and the seller can only sell to agents in one of them. On the other hand, we show that there is a mechanism that competes with a symmetrized version of this benchmark. We further investigate the more traditional best fixed price profit benchmark and show that there are mechanisms that compete with it in any downward-closed settings.
Förderung
- Yahoo! Research
- Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
Zitieren
APA
Karlin, A. R., Nguyen, C. T., & Peres, Y. (2013). Selling in Exclusive Markets. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. https://doi.org/10.1145/2465769.2465772
Vancouver
Karlin AR, Nguyen CT, Peres Y. Selling in Exclusive Markets. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2013. doi:10.1145/2465769.2465772
BibTeX
@article{Karlin2013,
author = {Karlin, Anna R. and Nguyen, C. Thach and Peres, Yuval},
title = {Selling in Exclusive Markets},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
year = {2013},
doi = {10.1145/2465769.2465772}
}
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