Stock and Option Proportions in Executive Compensation
Quarterly Journal of Finance · 2011
DOI: 10.1142/s2010139211000055 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Quarterly Journal of Finance, 2011. Verfasst von Phelim P. Boyle und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
There is controversy about the relative merits of stock and options in executive compensation. Some observers contend that stock is a more efficient mechanism, while others reach the opposite conclusion. We focus on the manager's risk-taking incentives and derive an optimal compensation contract by using the concept of a comparable benchmark and imposing a volatility constraint in a principal-agent framework. We demonstrate a joint role for both stock and options in the optimal contract. We show that firms with higher volatility should use more options in compensating their executives and provide empirical evidence supporting this testable implication.
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APA
Boyle, P. P., Jha, R., Kennedy, S., & Tian, W. (2011). Stock and Option Proportions in Executive Compensation. Quarterly Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139211000055
Vancouver
Boyle PP, Jha R, Kennedy S, Tian W. Stock and Option Proportions in Executive Compensation. Quarterly Journal of Finance. 2011. doi:10.1142/s2010139211000055
BibTeX
@article{Boyle2011,
author = {Boyle, Phelim P. and Jha, Ranjini and Kennedy, Shannon and Tian, Weidong},
title = {Stock and Option Proportions in Executive Compensation},
journal = {Quarterly Journal of Finance},
year = {2011},
doi = {10.1142/s2010139211000055}
}
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