Mean Field Game Model for an Advertising Competition in a Duopoly
International Game Theory Review · 2021-12 · 23 (04)
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198921500249 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Game Theory Review, online erschienen am 23.02.2022. Verfasst von René Carmona und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 9-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 25 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: AFOSR.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this study, we analyze an advertising competition in a duopoly. We consider two different notions of equilibrium. We model the companies in the duopoly as major players, and the consumers as minor players. In our first game model, we identify Nash Equilibrium (NE) between all the players. Next we frame the model to lead to the search for Multi-Leader–Follower Nash Equilibrium (MLF-NE). This approach is reminiscent of Stackelberg games in the sense that the major players design their advertisement policies assuming that the minor players are rational and settle in a Nash Equilibrium among themselves. This rationality assumption reduces the competition between the major players to a two-player game. After solving these two models for the notions of equilibrium, we analyze the similarities and differences of the two different sets of equilibria.
Förderung
- AFOSR
Zitieren
APA
Carmona, R., & Dayanıklı, G. (2021). Mean Field Game Model for an Advertising Competition in a Duopoly. International Game Theory Review, 23(04). https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500249
Vancouver
Carmona R, Dayanıklı G. Mean Field Game Model for an Advertising Competition in a Duopoly. International Game Theory Review. 2021;23(04). doi:10.1142/s0219198921500249
BibTeX
@article{Carmona2021,
author = {Carmona, René and Dayanıklı, Gökçe},
title = {Mean Field Game Model for an Advertising Competition in a Duopoly},
journal = {International Game Theory Review},
year = {2021},
volume = {23},
number = {04},
doi = {10.1142/s0219198921500249}
}
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