Renewable Investment and Electricity Price Dynamics: A Mean Field Game Model
Sustainability · 25.06.2026 · 18 (13) · 6467
DOI: 10.3390/su18136467 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sustainability, online erschienen am 25.06.2026. Verfasst von Xiaohui Hou und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The growing penetration of renewable generation changes both producers’ marginal-cost and electricity-market price formation. This paper develops a mean field game model to examine how heterogeneous generators adjust marginal generation costs through renewable-oriented investment and how these decisions feed back into bid-stack clearing. Each generator controls the drift of its marginal cost, while the clearing price is determined by a demand-dependent quantile of the population cost distribution. The model leads to a coupled system with a non-local payoff. Simulations show that cost-reduction investment shifts the marginal-cost distribution toward lower-cost regions, but the widening distribution indicates heterogeneous effects. Generators below and close to the clearing margin have stronger incentives to reduce costs, whereas high-cost generators far above the margin face weaker incentives. These results suggest that market competition can support renewable-oriented cost reduction, but complementary policies may be needed for high-cost generators.
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APA
Hou, X., & Xue, X. (2026). Renewable Investment and Electricity Price Dynamics: A Mean Field Game Model. Sustainability, 18(13), 6467. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18136467
Vancouver
Hou X, Xue X. Renewable Investment and Electricity Price Dynamics: A Mean Field Game Model. Sustainability. 2026;18(13):6467. doi:10.3390/su18136467
BibTeX
@article{Hou2026,
author = {Hou, Xiaohui and Xue, Xingjian},
title = {Renewable Investment and Electricity Price Dynamics: A Mean Field Game Model},
journal = {Sustainability},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {13},
pages = {6467},
doi = {10.3390/su18136467}
}
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