A Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game Analysis of Industrial Wastewater Treatment in China Under the Background of Collaborative Governance

Vollständiger Abstract

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ABSTRACT This study develops a quadrilateral evolutionary game model to examine strategic interactions and system evolution among the central government, local governments, polluting enterprises and the public in industrial wastewater treatment (IWWT) under collaborative governance in China. Numerical simulations use official Chinese statistical data related to IWWT, supplemented by parameters from relevant literature. Results show that (1) Increasing central government punishment for incomplete local regulation, expanding special funds and strengthening central supervision can enhance local governments' regulatory enforcement while also incentivising polluting enterprises to implement wastewater treatment. (2) From reducing the environmental tax to increasing special funds share and then increasing the penalty, enterprises' treatment willingness shows an increasing trend. (3) Treatment costs and benefits significantly affect strategic decisions of polluting enterprises. Even with stricter local government regulations, enterprises still adhere loosely when costs are high. (4) Public supervision accelerates convergence towards the optimal‐stable strategy and reduces local governments' regulatory costs.