The Strength‐Is‐Weakness Effect in Coalition Formation: Why Strong Positions Can Lead to Worse Outcomes

Vollständiger Abstract

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ABSTRACT In coalition formation, strength can paradoxically become a liability: those who bring the most resources are often excluded from winning coalitions. We integrate classical coalition theories with recent experiments to clarify when strength backfires, when it is an asset, and how weaker players benefit. First, alignment of self‐interest and fairness norms enables weaker actors to justify excluding stronger ones. Second, the effect is also driven by the salience of self‐interest and fairness: most people self‐select into the strong role and avoid the weak one, and once in that role, the majority use allocation rules that alienate potential partners—resulting in their exclusion. Third, legitimacy matters: when resource advantages are perceived as deserved, strong actors regain coalition appeal. Finally, perspective‐taking, as an individual difference in adopting others' viewpoints, consistently predicts inclusion across roles. Together, these findings show that exclusion of the strong is not a fixed rule but a conditional outcome shaped by self‐interest, fairness, legitimacy, and perspective‐taking.