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Teleological Inference

Benjamin Claessens

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2026-11 · 113 (3) · 683-692

DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70165 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, published online on 2026-09-27. Written by Benjamin Claessens. 96 references.

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Abstract (original language)

How do we acquire teleological beliefs? A teleological belief is a belief that some event or process occurs for the sake of a purpose. Such beliefs include beliefs about actions, natural functions, and the meaning of life. This article will advance a theory of teleological inference. I will argue (1) that we acquire teleological beliefs by statistical inference, (2) that we conceive of a purpose as a type of difference‐maker, and (3) that we infer purposive relations as apparent difference‐making relations. The proposed theory claims empirical, phenomenological, and theoretical support. Empirically, it best explains the teleological bias: the universal human disposition to endorse teleological explanations of phenomena. It also explains a range of observed interactions between causal, normative, and purposive judgment. The theory suggests that mental state attributions play no essential role in teleological inference and explains the phenomenal character of agentive experience.

Cite

APA

Claessens, B. (2026). Teleological Inference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 113(3), 683-692. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70165

Vancouver

Claessens B. Teleological Inference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2026;113(3):683-692. doi:10.1111/phpr.70165

BibTeX
@article{Claessens2026,
  author = {Claessens, Benjamin},
  title = {Teleological Inference},
  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {113},
  number = {3},
  pages = {683--692},
  doi = {10.1111/phpr.70165}
}
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