The Question of Referentiality
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2026-11 · 113 (3) · 657-669
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70162 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, published online on 2026-09-22. Written by Eliot Michaelson. 73 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
Most theorists have offered different accounts of reference fixing for names, demonstratives, and indexicals. Indeed, this variety can seem an inevitable response to a certain class of hard cases. Here, I will offer a unified account of reference fixing equally capable of handling these cases. Then, I will show how to extend the account to help Predicativists about names and Quantificationalists about demonstratives accommodate these cases as well. One interesting upshot of this strategy is that it offers a way of explaining what makes a term referential that doesn't appeal to logical form.
Cite
APA
Michaelson, E. (2026). The Question of Referentiality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 113(3), 657-669. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70162
Vancouver
Michaelson E. The Question of Referentiality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2026;113(3):657-669. doi:10.1111/phpr.70162
BibTeX
@article{Michaelson2026,
author = {Michaelson, Eliot},
title = {The Question of Referentiality},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {113},
number = {3},
pages = {657--669},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.70162}
}
EUVIMED