The Question of Referentiality
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2026-11 · 113 (3) · 657-669
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70162 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, online erschienen am 22.09.2026. Verfasst von Eliot Michaelson. Die Arbeit nennt 73 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Most theorists have offered different accounts of reference fixing for names, demonstratives, and indexicals. Indeed, this variety can seem an inevitable response to a certain class of hard cases. Here, I will offer a unified account of reference fixing equally capable of handling these cases. Then, I will show how to extend the account to help Predicativists about names and Quantificationalists about demonstratives accommodate these cases as well. One interesting upshot of this strategy is that it offers a way of explaining what makes a term referential that doesn't appeal to logical form.
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APA
Michaelson, E. (2026). The Question of Referentiality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 113(3), 657-669. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70162
Vancouver
Michaelson E. The Question of Referentiality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2026;113(3):657-669. doi:10.1111/phpr.70162
BibTeX
@article{Michaelson2026,
author = {Michaelson, Eliot},
title = {The Question of Referentiality},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {113},
number = {3},
pages = {657--669},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.70162}
}
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