Conspiracy Theories and Conspiratorial Cover‐Ups
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2026-11 · 113 (3) · 632-641
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70161 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, published online on 2026-09-16. Written by Austin Raye Ploeger. 31 references.
Abstract (original language)
Most people are suspicious of conspiracy theories. The claims that water fluoridation is mass poisoning, that the UN deliberately released the COVID‐19 virus, and that George Bush was responsible for 9/11 are, to many of us, obviously absurd. Nevertheless, it has proven surprisingly difficult to explain why we should be suspicious of conspiracy theories as a class , in any general way. In this article, I present a solution to this problem. I identify a general feature of conspiracy theories and argue that this feature makes it impossible for high credences regarding conspiracy theories to be rationally justified. More specifically, I argue that conspiracy theories are claims that, if true, imply that certain skeptical‐hypothesis‐like claims “cover‐up claims” are extremely likely to be true. As a consequence, if we think that high credences regarding skeptical hypotheses cannot be rationally justified, we should also think that high credences regarding conspiracy theories cannot be justified.
Cite
APA
Ploeger, A. R. (2026). Conspiracy Theories and Conspiratorial Cover‐Ups. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 113(3), 632-641. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70161
Vancouver
Ploeger AR. Conspiracy Theories and Conspiratorial Cover‐Ups. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2026;113(3):632-641. doi:10.1111/phpr.70161
BibTeX
@article{Ploeger2026,
author = {Ploeger, Austin Raye},
title = {Conspiracy Theories and Conspiratorial Cover‐Ups},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {113},
number = {3},
pages = {632--641},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.70161}
}
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