Are Rights Self‐Other Symmetric?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2026-05 · 112 (3) · 617-627
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70104 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, published online on 2026-03-01. Written by Collis Tahzib. Cited 1 times so far (Crossref); 32 references.
Abstract (original language)
Recently, there have been several defenses of self‐other symmetry. On this view, we have the same rights against ourselves as we have against others. In this paper, I challenge this view by arguing that even if some rights (such as rights against serious harm) are symmetric, rights against minor harm are not plausibly symmetric. To this end, I present four pairs of cases involving accidental, negligent, drunken and intrinsically non‐consentable minor harm in which self‐other symmetry's implications are highly counterintuitive. Next I provide theoretical support for these intuitions by explaining how denying them threatens to eradicate the category of prudence. I then consider and reject two responses available to defenders of self‐other symmetry: namely, that rights are self‐other symmetric in content but not stringency, and that self‐other symmetry's intuitive and theoretical costs are outweighed by the benefits of simplicity and parsimony. I conclude by proposing two novel and weakened self‐other symmetry theses that are immune to the foregoing counterexamples and are worthy of further investigation.
Cite
APA
Tahzib, C. (2026). Are Rights Self‐Other Symmetric?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 112(3), 617-627. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70104
Vancouver
Tahzib C. Are Rights Self‐Other Symmetric?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2026;112(3):617-627. doi:10.1111/phpr.70104
BibTeX
@article{Tahzib2026,
author = {Tahzib, Collis},
title = {Are Rights Self‐Other Symmetric?},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {112},
number = {3},
pages = {617--627},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.70104}
}
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