Doomsday or Multiverse Bias
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2026-05 · 112 (3) · 608-616
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70103 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, published online on 2026-02-25. Written by Yoaav Isaacs. 24 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
Bayesian epistemology faces serious challenges when dealing with self‐locating evidence. This paper argues that, given two modest assumptions about how confirmation should work (Patterning and Live Centers), Bayesianism faces an unavoidable dilemma. We must either accept an implausible form of reasoning where our mere existence provides evidence that the future is short (Doomsday), or accept an equally implausible form where our existence favors hypotheses positing vastly more observers (Multiverse Bias). Since the underlying assumptions are hard to deny, and both horns of the dilemma are deeply unpalatable, this result reveals a major problem for Bayesian epistemology.
Cite
APA
Isaacs, Y. (2026). Doomsday or Multiverse Bias. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 112(3), 608-616. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70103
Vancouver
Isaacs Y. Doomsday or Multiverse Bias. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2026;112(3):608-616. doi:10.1111/phpr.70103
BibTeX
@article{Isaacs2026,
author = {Isaacs, Yoaav},
title = {Doomsday or Multiverse Bias},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {112},
number = {3},
pages = {608--616},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.70103}
}
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