Why Paternalism Is Wrong (When It Is Wrong)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2026-05 · 112 (3) · 578-593
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70099 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, published online on 2026-02-24. Written by Jonathan Parry. Cited 1 times so far (Crossref); 76 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0). Funded by: UK Research and Innovation.
Abstract (original language)
This paper proposes a novel reinterpretation of the familiar, if inchoate, thought that paternalism offends against an ideal of personal sovereignty. The central idea is that (competent) persons have a particular kind of normative power. Just as each of us has the right to control how others are permitted to use our bodies or property, we each have a structurally similar right to control how others are permitted to use our good . When others seek to benefit us without adequately consulting our will, they trespass into a domain that is ours to control, treating us as lacking rights that we in fact have. The paper argues that this theory of anti‐paternalism is superior to existing accounts, is independently attractive, and rests on deeper foundations.
Funding
- UK Research and Innovation
Cite
APA
Parry, J. (2026). Why Paternalism Is Wrong (When It Is Wrong). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 112(3), 578-593. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70099
Vancouver
Parry J. Why Paternalism Is Wrong (When It Is Wrong). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2026;112(3):578-593. doi:10.1111/phpr.70099
BibTeX
@article{Parry2026,
author = {Parry, Jonathan},
title = {Why Paternalism Is Wrong (When It Is Wrong)},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {112},
number = {3},
pages = {578--593},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.70099}
}
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